the conversation gap: the laws of war, and who they apply to
what the law actually says
on march 13, 2026, secretary of defense pete hegseth stood before cameras and said: "no quarter, no mercy for our enemies." most people who heard it had no framework to evaluate that phrase. under international humanitarian law, it is a war crime. understanding why requires a framework most americans were never given. that is the conversation we are not having.
international humanitarian law, known as ihl, governs how wars are conducted once they begin. it is distinct from the question of whether going to war was legal. that question is governed by jus ad bellum, grounded in the united nations charter, which permits force only in self-defense or when authorized by the security council. ihl governs jus in bello: conduct during hostilities, regardless of how the war started or which party is considered the aggressor. a war of disputed origins must still be conducted in compliance with ihl. the rules apply equally to all sides.
three principles sit at the core of ihl.
distinction: civilians and civilian objects, including schools, hospitals, and power plants not used for military purposes, may not be deliberately targeted.
proportionality: even where a legitimate military objective exists, an attack is prohibited if civilian harm is excessive relative to the anticipated military advantage.
precaution: all feasible steps must be taken to minimize harm to civilians.
violating these principles deliberately can constitute a war crime under the rome statute and the geneva conventions.
the architecture removed before the war began
what makes this moment legally distinct is not only the conduct in the field. it is that the institutional structures designed to keep u.s. military operations in compliance with ihl were dismantled before the conflict began.
to understand why that matters, it helps to see the two legal frameworks as operating on different tracks. jus ad bellum governs the decision to go to war. jus in bello governs everything that happens once fighting begins: which targets are legitimate, how much civilian harm is acceptable relative to military gain, what obligations commanders carry at the moment they issue orders. the second track does not depend on the first. a war can be lawful in its initiation and still be conducted unlawfully. the structures removed since january 2025 operated entirely on that second track.
secretary hegseth removed the army, navy, and air force judge advocates general, the officers responsible for legal oversight of combat operations, and abolished the pentagon's civilian harm assessment units. the 2026 national defense strategy omits any reference to civilian protection or international law. the judge advocate general corps exists to ensure that targeting decisions are reviewed for legal compliance before they are executed. when those structures are removed, the safeguards are absent at the moment the decisions are made.
what the record shows
on april 2, 2026, over 100 u.s.-based international law professors and practitioners, including oona hathaway, the gerard c. and bernice latrobe smith professor of international law at yale law school and president-elect of the american society of international law, and tom dannenbaum, professor of law at stanford, published a formal letter on just security documenting their legal concerns about the conduct of the iran conflict. the letter was also signed by former u.s. government legal advisors and former judge advocates general.
their concerns included the systematic dismantling of the institutional structures designed to keep u.s. military operations in compliance with ihl. the signatories described these changes as "deliberately and systematically" weakening ihl compliance protections, and noted they are "especially concerning" in the context of an active armed conflict.
the letter also documents strikes on civilian infrastructure, including iran's south pars gas fields and water desalination plants. according to the iranian red crescent, 67,414 civilian sites were struck in the first month of hostilities, including 498 schools and 236 health facilities. airwars documented at least 1,443 iranian civilians killed, including a verified minimum of 217 children, between february 28 and march 23.
the minab school strike is under particular scrutiny. on february 28, the shajareh tayyebeh girls' elementary school in southern iran was struck in the opening hours of the conflict. more than 165 people were killed, most of them children between seven and twelve. investigations by the new york times, cnn, and human rights watch concluded the united states was likely responsible, based on outdated intelligence from the defense intelligence agency. human rights watch has described it as a potential war crime.
which brings the piece back to hegseth's words. under the hague regulations of 1907, incorporated into the dod's own law of war manual, declaring that no quarter will be given is explicitly forbidden. it is a war crime under ihl and a potential violation of u.s. federal law. the war crimes act, 18 u.s.c. § 2441, specifically incorporates hague and geneva violations into american criminal statute. this is not solely an international concern. it is a potential domestic legal breach.
all parties
ihl applies to iran as well, under the same framework and by the same standard. iran's strikes on desalination plants in bahrain and kuwait, on residential towers across gulf states, and on commercial vessels in the strait of hormuz raise serious legal concerns. the international maritime organization has confirmed at least 18 incidents involving commercial vessels. the un human rights office has called for investigation of strikes on densely populated civilian areas. the icrc has stated that "civilians are paying a heavy price amid escalating hostilities."
the law does not become less binding because the other side is also violating it. where both sides appear to be in violation, the enforcement gap, not the legal standard, is the structural failure.
why that gap cannot be closed from the outside
the united states is not a member of the icc and holds a veto on the un security council. no formal international accountability mechanism has a jurisdictional path to u.s. conduct. what remains are allied governments' obligations under common article 1 of the geneva conventions, which requires all state parties to press for compliance, and domestic accountability through congress and the courts. both depend on a documentary record and political will that are, right now, uncertain.
as of april 7, 2026, ceasefire negotiations are ongoing. iran has rejected proposals for a temporary pause, countering with a demand for a permanent end to the war. the military operation continues. the legal framework applies regardless of how those negotiations resolve.
the geneva conventions are precise, binding, and ratified by every recognized country in the world. understanding them is not a legal exercise. it is how an informed public evaluates what is being done in its name.
the conversation gap, every tuesday.
