the edit, vol. 15
the shift in american foreign policy
the helicopters over caracas on january 3 were not an aberration. they were an announcement.
u.s. special operations forces extracted nicolás maduro from his residence at 2:01am local time, supported by more than 150 aircraft from 20 bases. by dawn, a head of state was in federal custody in manhattan. by afternoon, the administration was speaking not of a discrete operation but of "managing" venezuela, of american companies rebuilding its infrastructure, of access to petroleum reserves.
this is not the foreign policy promised during the campaign.
rhetoric and reality
"america first" was sold as restraint. the message was consistent: no more nation-building, no more regime change, no more playing world police. no more forever wars or foreign entanglements that drained american resources for uncertain returns.
the venezuela operation suggests that restraint was a campaign message, not a governing principle. conducted without congressional notification or authorization for use of military force, executed under executive authority alone, it was followed by statements about managing a sovereign nation and deploying american companies to rebuild its economy. within days, the administration was discussing military options for acquiring greenland from a nato ally—a territory rich in rare earth minerals, oil, and natural gas reserves critical to technology and defense industries.
this represents not withdrawal but reassertion—american power in its most direct form, executed with deliberate speed.
what makes this different
american intervention abroad is not new. guatemala 1954, chile 1973, grenada 1983, panama 1989—the twentieth century offers precedents. but those operations were typically framed as responses to existential threats: communist expansion, protection of american citizens, restoration of democracy. they were presented as exceptions to normal policy, as unique crises demanding unique responses.
the current moment is distinguished by the abandonment of that exceptionalism. there is less construction of legal scaffolding, less deference to international institutions, and—most notably—less concern with domestic authorization. the panama operation that captured manuel noriega in 1989 occurred under a president who had served as vice president for eight years, operating within established cold war frameworks. today's venezuela action comes from an administration explicitly elected to end this type of engagement.
the language has changed too. previous administrations spoke of "restoring democracy" or "protecting american interests" with attention to sovereignty principles. current discourse is more direct: talk of "running" other countries, of american administrative control, of resource access. this is not the language of temporary intervention. it is the language of control.
congressional response: bipartisan concern, partisan outcomes
the operation's execution without congressional notification has drawn objections across party lines, though with different emphases and outcomes.
democratic senator tim kaine of virginia, ranking member on the foreign relations committee, has been among the most vocal critics, calling the operation "illegal" and arguing it represents "a sickening return to a day when the United States asserted the right to dominate the internal political affairs of all nations in the Western Hemisphere." kaine introduced a war powers resolution to block further military action without congressional authorization.
but the republican response has been divided. senate foreign relations chairman james risch called the operation "a decisive action against a narco-terrorist regime that has threatened u.s. interests and oppressed its own people for decades." house speaker mike johnson said he supported the president's actions while calling for a classified briefing on scope.
democratic leadership was more uniformly critical. minority leader hakeem jeffries stated that "taking military action without congressional authorization sets a dangerous precedent that undermines constitutional checks and balances."
no legislative action to formally review or constrain executive authority has succeeded.
the global response
international reaction has ranged from condemnation to calculated silence.
at an emergency un security council session, brazil's representative stated that "the sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations cannot be violated, regardless of the character of their governments." china characterized the operation as "a flagrant violation of international law and the un charter."
european responses were more measured. germany's foreign minister expressed "deep concern about the precedent this sets" while noting maduro's documented human rights record. france emphasized that "actions must be consistent with international law" without explicitly condemning the operation.
criticism sharpened after administration statements on greenland. danish prime minister mette frederiksen called forced territorial transfer "absurd" and emphasized that "greenland belongs to the greenlanders." norway's prime minister jonas gahr støre stated that "threatening military action against a democratic ally is deeply concerning and contrary to nato principles."
nato secretary general mark rutte declined direct comment but noted that article 5 commitments—the alliance's mutual defense clause—apply to denmark and its territories.
the silence from some quarters has been equally notable. gulf states dependent on american security guarantees issued no public statements. neither did several asian allies. this silence may reflect calculations about future american actions and the cost of opposition.
implications for americans
events in caracas feel remote from daily american life. but intervention's downstream effects rarely stay contained.
economically, past interventions have carried substantial costs. the 1989 panama operation cost approximately $163 million (roughly $400 million today); iraq and afghanistan ran into trillions. while the venezuela operation itself may be less expensive, extended american administrative involvement would require sustained funding when domestic infrastructure needs remain acute.
venezuela holds some of the world's largest petroleum reserves. if american companies gain preferred access, gasoline prices could be affected—though the mechanism and timeline remain uncertain. previous interventions in oil-producing regions have not consistently meant lower prices for american consumers.
diplomatically, abandoning restraint rhetoric while pursuing territorial ambitions toward allies creates uncertainty in longstanding relationships. if military options remain "on the table" for disputes with nato members, other partners must recalibrate their understanding of american commitments. this uncertainty carries costs: reduced intelligence sharing, complicated military cooperation, hedging behavior from allies who no longer consider american intentions predictable.
there is also precedent. if the united states can extract a head of state without congressional authorization and without regard to sovereignty principles, other powers will cite this precedent. russia in ukraine, china regarding taiwan—both will be argued with reference to american behavior. american objections to such actions will carry less weight.
what comes next
past interventions tended to be singular events, however consequential. what distinguishes the current moment is not only the caracas operation but the pattern it may represent: rapid action, minimal deliberation, explicit language about control rather than temporary influence, public discussion of additional territorial objectives.
this is not yet a doctrine, but it has the elements of one.
whether this approach continues depends on several factors: domestic political will, international pushback, economic costs, and the success or failure of the venezuela operation itself. if american administrative involvement in venezuela proves expensive or chaotic, appetite for additional action may diminish. if congressional opposition coalesces into actual constraints on executive authority, the path becomes narrower. if allied relationships fracture under the strain of territorial threats, costs accumulate.
but the caracas operation demonstrated something: the guardrails assumed to constrain american military action—congressional authorization, alliance consultation, deference to sovereignty norms—are not as fixed as institutions presumed. they can be overridden when an administration chooses to do so.
the question is not whether the united states retains the capacity for intervention. that capacity has never been in doubt. the question is whether there remain meaningful constraints on its use, and whether american foreign policy in 2025 will be defined by what was said during the campaign or what was done in caracas.
the helicopters were not an aberration. they were an announcement.
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